Efficient Responses to Targeted Cash Transfers by Attanasio, OP & Lechene, V
E¢ cient responses to targeted cash transfers
Orazio P. Attanasio Valérie Lechene
May 8, 2013
Abstract
The unitary model has been rejected many times. In this paper, we
start from one such rejection in the context of rural Mexico and propose
a test of one of the main alternatives to the unitary model, the so called
collective model, a model that assumes that intrahousehold allocations,
however, determined, are e¢ cient. The test we propose requires the con-
sideration of a demand system with at least two commodities and at least
two distribution factors, that is, variables that a¤ect expenditure shares
while not a¤ecting preferences or budget constraints. Conditional cash
transfer programmes, which have become extremely popular in develop-
ing countries and target poor households to receive large cash transfers,
under certain conditions, o¤er a particularly attractive contexts because
transfers are often targeted to women. Moreover, in Mexico, the CCT
impacts were evaluated by randomly assigning treatmentand control
localities to an earlyand latestart, therefore providing us with exoge-
nous variation in a plausible distribution factor. The programme a¤ects
expenditure shares even after controlling for the additional resources given
to the eligible households, therefore indicating a rejection of the unitary
model of household behaviour. We also nd that the relative strength
of the family network of household members a¤ects household choices.
Having identied two distribution factors, we show that they do so in
a way that is consistent with the collective model: they a¤ect expendi-
ture shares proportionally, indicating that they enter the demand system
through a single factor. We test this hypothesis using z-conditional de-
mands embedded within a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System for
food components.
Keywords: Intrahousehold allocation, collective rationality, social ex-
periment, conditional cash transfers, QUAIDS, food.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus that households decisions are not accurately rep-
resented by the so-called unitary model, which assumes that the household acts
as a single decision unit maximizing a common utility function. Many implica-
tions of the unitary model have been soundly rejected in empirical applications,
although in many cases one could think of possible explanations of the empirical
ndings that would salvage the model. The main reason for this remaining am-
biguity is that many tests focus on the role of what in the literature is referred
to as distribution factors.1 These are variables that do not a¤ect preferences,
prices or resources and, therefore, under the unitary model, should not a¤ect the
allocation of resources. The issue is then to identify variables whose variation
is arguably not related to preferences and resources.
If one assumes that intrahousehold allocations are determined by the interac-
tion of di¤erent agents with di¤erent objectives, then the issue is to characterize
these allocations when one knows little of the bargaining processes that go on
inside the household. An attractive approach is the so-called collective model
proposed by Chiappori (1988), which does not take a stand on the specics of
intrahousehold decisions but only assumes that allocations are e¢ cient. Among
others, Browning and Chiappori (1998) and more recently Bourguignon, Brown-
ing and Chiappori (2009) have shown that this model does, in principle, impose
strong restrictions on the data. Many of these restrictions, however, require the
identication of multiple distribution factors, which can be di¢ cult to observe
in practice. In particular, it is di¢ cult to nd data containing information on
variables that can be plausibly interpreted as distribution factors and whose
variation is exogenous with respect to individual tastes.
The main innovation of this paper is to provide a test of the collective model
in a context where we can identify two plausible distribution factors. Moreover,
the variation of at least one of the factors we consider is, by construction, ex-
ogenous, as it is driven by the randomization implemented to evaluate a welfare
programme. This context, therefore, constitutes a unique and novel opportunity
1There is a bit of a semantic issue here. In some papers, distribution factors are understood
to be any factor that a¤ects the intrahousehold allocation of resources. Here and throughout
this paper, we mean by a distribution factora variable that a¤ects the intrahousehold allo-
cation of resources and does not a¤ect either the budget constraint nor preferences. Under a
unitary model, therefore, a distribution factor should not enter demand equations.
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to provide a strong test of the collective model.
Since the implementation in 1998 of PROGRESA (subsequently renamed as
as Oportunidades) in Mexico and (around the same time) of the predecessor
of Bolsa Familia in Brazil, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have
been put in place in many developing countries and have become extremely
popular. They have been shown to result in important reductions in poverty.
Beneciary households in many countries, ranging from Mexico to Brazil, to
Colombia and others, have been shown to enjoy higher consumption, increased
school enrolment and better children nutritional status (see Fiszbein and Schady,
2009).2
An important feature of most of the CCT programmes that have been im-
plemented in many countries is that the transfers are targeted explicitly to
women, often with the explicit objective to change the condition of women
within the household. The mother of the children associated with the pro-
gramme receives the cash transfers (and participates to the programs activi-
ties). The programme, therefore, explicitly and deliberately changes the control
of resources within the households, increasing the share of total income con-
trolled by women. Moreover, because of the programme, women are involved
in new activities that imply that they go out more and have more frequent
connections with other women in the locality. This structure makes it possible
that the programme changes the balance of power within the household and,
as a consequence, the allocation of resources. Implicit in this argument is, of
course, that the allocation of resources within the households is a function of
who controls them, a clear violation of the so-called unitary model.
The evaluation of many of CCT programmes has brought to light a re-
markable fact: following the injection of cash in the budget of poor households
induced by CCTs (in Mexico, about 20% of household income), as total expendi-
ture and consumption increase as expected, the consumption of food increases,
proportionally, at least as much, so that the share of food among beneciaries
either increases or stays constant. This contradicts the standard view that, as
a necessity, food has an income elasticity less than unity so that when total
2 In the case of PROGRESA/Oportunidades, there are many papers that have looked at the
impacts of the programme on various outcomes. The initial impact evaluation was carried out
by IFPRI and its results are summarized in Skouas (2001). Other papers in this literature
include Skouas and Mccla¤erty (2001) Skouas and Parker (2001) and Schultz (2004).
2
consumption increases, the share of food should decrease. This fact has been
documented in the context of the urban version of the Mexican programme
by Angelucci and Attanasio (2009, 2012), in rural Mexico by Attanasio and
Lechene (2010), in the context of a similar programme in Colombia by Attana-
sio, Battistin and Mesnard (2012), in the case of a cash transfer programme in
Ecuador by Schady and Rosero (2008) and in Nicaragua. A recent World Bank
Policy Research Report (see Fiszbein and Schady, 2009) documents the same
phenomenon in other countries.
In Attanasio and Lechene (2010), we document the fact that the food bud-
get share does not decrease in rural Mexico as total consumption increases as
a consequence of the programme and rule out a number of reasons why this
could be, such as price increases, changes in the quality of food consumed and
homotheticity of preferences as explanations for this puzzle. By estimating a
carefully specied Engel curve, we show that food is indeed a necessity, with
a strong negative e¤ect of income on the food budget share. In other words,
higher levels of income or total expenditure are associated (in a cross section of
observations not yet a¤ected by a CCT) with lower levels of the food share.
In the case of PROGRESA/Oportunidades, therefore, as income and total
consumption are increased substantially by the programme, the tendency of the
food budget share to go down is counterbalanced by some other e¤ect of the
programme so that the net e¤ect is nil. Whilst PROGRESA/Oportunidades is
a complex intervention with many components, we argue that the programme
has not changed preferences and that there is no labelling of money. We propose
that the key to the puzzle resides in the fact that the transfer is put in the hands
of women and that the change in control over household resources is what leads
to the observed changes in behaviour. In this sense, the evidence points to a
substantial and strong rejection of the unitary model, as we have argued in
Attanasio and Lechene (2002).
In this paper, we take the rejection of the unitary model as given and use
the same data to test the collective model. In particular, we ask if the e¤ect
that PROGRESA/Oportunidades and other distribution factors have on the
demand of di¤erent commodities is consistent with the restrictions imposed by
the collective model. The shift in the Engel curves induced by the programme
is strong and well documented both in our case and in that of other CCTs. As
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we discuss below, one way to see our exercise is to ask whether the collective
model can explain these shifts in the Engel curves. In this sense, our evidence
constitutes a very strong test, both because some of the variation we use is truly
random and because we burden the collective model with the task of explaining
a strong shift in behaviour. A rst important and original contribution of this
paper, therefore, is to use the exogenous variation generated by the random
assignment of a welfare programme to test the collective model.
We implement these ideas using the same data from the evaluation of PRO-
GRESA we used in Attanasio and Lechene (2002) and in Attanasio and Lechene
(2010). The execution of the exercise, however, is not trivial, as it has to solve a
number of di¢ cult issues. First, we need to identify a plausible distribution fac-
tor apart from the (exogenously determined) participation to the programme.
One of the innovations of this paper is to use a variable that measures the rela-
tive bargaining strength of the husband and wife within the household by using
data on the network of relatives present in the village and their wealth. Second,
as in Attanasio and Lechene (2002), to guarantee that PROGRESA can be con-
sidered a genuine distribution factor, in addition to total expenditure we have
to control for behaviour induced by the conditionalities of the programme and
in particular school enrolment. The demand functions are all conditional on
the school enrolment behaviour of children of various ages. We allow enrolment
to be simultaneously (and endogenously) determined with the demand func-
tions. Third, we need to deal with the issues that arise with the estimation of
a demand system, and, in particular, with the endogeneity of total expenditure
and, in the case of the conditional demand function, of the conditioning good.
To control for the endogeneity of total expenditure, we use a control function
approach, as discussed in Attanasio, Battistin and Mesnard (2012). To control
for the endogeneity of the conditioning good, we use the excluded distribution
factor.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. Being in a village (ran-
domly) targeted by PROGRESA turns out to have an important e¤ect on the
expenditure shares we model, over and above the e¤ect of total consumption
(which is also a¤ected by the programme). Moreover, we nd that our addi-
tional distribution factor (the relative size of husband and wifes networks) also
enters signicantly the demand system. These results can be interpreted as yet
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another rejection of the unitary model. However, we nd that these two distrib-
ution factors enter in the ve equation demand system in a proportional fashion,
consistently with the predictions of the collective model. In particular, when
we test the restriction that the PROGRESA program is not signicant in what
Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009) have dened as z-conditional de-
mand, we cannot reject the null that the living in a PROGRESA village does
not a¤ect z-conditional demands. This is equivalent to testing a set of pro-
portionality restrictions which are the necessary and su¢ cient conditions of the
collective model. We conclude that the data are not inconsistent with the collec-
tive model. This nding is also conrmed by the fact that observed changes in
consumption shares are not statistically di¤erent from the predictions using the
program impacts on total consumption and the estimates of a demand system
which allow the distribution factors to a¤ect its intercepts.
The main contribution of our paper is not the rejection of the unitary model,
which has been rejected many times already. The main point of the paper is
that the collective model can explain a clean, specic and strong deviation from
the unitary model. The rejection we consider is particularly salient because the
variation in the control of resources is by construction exogenous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the
framework and the theoretical results on which the empirical analysis is based.
We show the form taken by the demand functions in the case of two distinct
hypothesis on the intra-household negociation process: unitary rationality and
collective rationality. We also present the tests of collective rationality based on
z conditional demands. In section 3, we present the economic context and the
data, a sample of poor households from the Mexican population randomly drawn
to receive or not to receive large cash transfers. We then document the fact
that motivates the analysis: the absence of e¤ect of large cash transfers on the
structure of the budget, in section 3.5. In section 4, we discuss our distribution
factors. In section 5, we discuss the methodological issues pertinent to the
estimation of a demand system in the context of a CCT programme. In section
6, we present the empirical results: we estimate a demand system to evaluate the
impact of Oportunidades on food consumption, and we present tests of e¢ ciency
of decisions, using the conditional approach derived in Browning, Bourguignon
and Chiappori (2009) within a modied Quaids. Section 7 concludes.
5
2 Theoretical framework
We consider households with 2 adult decision makers3 A and B: There are n
private consumption goods on which the household can spend, qAi and q
B
i ; where
qji denotes the private consumption of good i by agent j and i = 1; :::; n; and
Q denotes the m vector of household consumption of public goods: Household
consumption of good i is qi = qAi + q
B
i : Vector q
A is the vector of private good
consumption of individual A and similarly for B: Household private consump-
tion is q = qA + qB : Individual preferences are dened on the consumption of
private goods and public goods, and they also depend on a set of demographic
taste shifter d; called preference factors vA(qA; qB ; Q; d) and vB(qA; qB ; Q; d):
Denoting exogenous total expenditure by x, the budget constraint is
p0(qA + qB) + P 0Q = p0q + P 0Q = x (1)
where p and P are the price vectors of private and public goods respectively.
Individual preferences are in general not identical so that there must exist
some mechanism by which households reach decisions. We consider two such
mechanisms. One leads to a standard unitary model and the other to a general
collective model. We show how the demand functions di¤er in these two cases.
In what follows, we will denote i the demand function for good i; irrespective
of whether it is a private or public good when we discuss properties which are
shared by public and private goods. Browning, Chiappori, Lechene (2006) give
a detailed discussion of the distinction between unitary and collective models
when there are price variations.
2.1 Demand functions in the unitary model
One way to rationalise a unitary model based on individual preferences is to as-
sume that households maximise a weighted sum of individual preferences where
the weights are xed.
MaxqA;qB ;Qv
A(qA; qB ; Q; d) + (1  )vB(qA; qB ; Q; d) (2)
3This assumption is not as restrictive as it may appear. First, a major part of the sample of
poor households we consider are composed of a couple with any number of dependent relatives
(children and others). Second, a number of the tests we describe can be extended to the case
of households with any number of decision makers. For ease of exposition, we here limit the
discussion to the case of nuclear households.
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subject to the budget constraint (1). With xed weights , this is equivalent to
assuming the existence of a utility function U(qA; qB ; Q; d) which, maximised,
gives rise to demand functions i(x; p; P; d) for i = 1; :::; n:
4The quantity de-
manded for any good i depends on total expenditure x; prices p and P and
taste shifters d. For well behaved individual utility functions, the demand func-
tions must satisfy adding up, homogeneity, symmetry and the Slustky matrix
of compensated price responses must be negative semi denite.
2.2 Demand functions in the collective model
A well known alternative to the unitary model is the so-called collective model
(Chiappori 1988, 1992). Unlike in the unitary model, it is not assumed that
the weights given to the utility of each individual in the household are xed,
but that they can vary with a variety of factors. The only restriction imposed
on the negotiation mechanism in the collective model is that it yields e¢ cient
allocations of resources, that is that outcomes are Pareto e¢ cient, given the
preferences of the individuals in the household.
Within the collective model, the weights  in equation (2) can depend on a
variety of factors, including prices and factors that a¤ect the budget constraint.
We furthermore assume that there exist some observable factors z which play a
role in the negotiation but do not a¤ect either the budget constraint or individ-
ual preferences. Following the literature, these are called distribution factors.
Notice that while variables that a¤ect the weights but also enter the budget
constraint or a¤ect preferences (such as prices or total income) might be ra-
tionalized within the unitary model, distribution factors should not appear in
the demand functions associated with such a model. Therefore, variables that
can be plausibly be dened as distribution factors, are extremely useful to test
the collective model as an alternative to the unitary model. As we argue be-
low, if one can identify more than one distribution factor, one can construct
powerful tests of the collective model as well, in that the model imposes strong
restrictions on the way these factors enter the demand functions.
When there exist multiple distribution factors z; Pareto e¢ ciency implies
4The representation of the unitary model in equation (2) is not the only possible and is
somewhat restrictive. Most of the restrictions of the unitary model, such as income pool-
ing, can be obtained from the maximization of a generic function W (vA; vB). We use this
representation to relate it to our formulation of the collective model, where  depends on
distribution factors.
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restrictions on the manner in which they a¤ect demand. These restrictions
follow from the fact that distribution factors, as they do not a¤ect preferences or
budget constraints, enter only through the index that denes the relative weights
of the two adults in the Pareto problem. Household decisions can be represented
as resulting from the maximisation of a generalised household welfare function,
subject to the household budget constraint (1):
MaxqA;qB ;Q(x; p; P; d; z)v
A(qA; qB ; Q; d)+ (1 (x; p; P; d; z))vB(qA; qB ; Q; d)
(3)
For any good, private or public, the demand function for good i derived
from the programme above is i(x; p; P; d; z) which depends on total expenditure
x, prices, p and P; preference factors d and distribution factors z. Demand
functions in the collective model satisfy adding up and homogeneity. However,
it is well known that they do not satisfy symmetry, but rather that the Pseudo
Slustky matrix of compensated price responses is the sum of a symmetric matrix
and a matrix of rank 1 (Browning, Chiappori, 1998).
When discussing tests of the collective model in the next section, we assume
that it is possible to nd a set of variables which are incontroversially distrib-
ution factors. Whether it is possible to nd any such variables is of course an
important question. In the absence of a theory of marriage and of the deter-
mination of power, the decision whether a given characteristic is treated as a
distribution factor z or as a preference factor d is an (untestable) identifying
assumption.
2.3 Tests of collective rationality
Tests of collective rationality di¤er depending upon whether the data contains
price variation or not, and whether distribution factors are observed. We focus
here on tests with distribution factors.
Browning, Bourguignon and Chiappori (2009) show that testing for collective
rationality is equivalent to testing any of the following three conditions:
i(x; p; P; d; z) = i(x; p; P; d; (x; p; P; d; z)) 8i = 1; :::; n (4)
@i=@zk
@i=@zl
=
@j=@zk
@j=@zl
8i; j; k; l (5)
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@ji (x; p; P; d; z 1; Cj)
@zk
= 0 8i 6= j; and k = 2; :::;K (6)
The rst condition states that the functional form of the demand function is
restricted so that the distribution factors only a¤ect demands through an index.
The second condition is a proportionality restriction which states that the ratio
of partial derivatives of the quantities demanded with respect to the distribution
factors have to be equal across goods. This restriction follows easily from the
rst and has been tested for instance in Bourguignon et al. (1993).
To derive the nal condition, let us assume that there exists at least one good
j and one observable distribution factor z1 such that j(x; p; P; d; z) is strictly
monotonic in z1: Then invert demand for j so that z1 = (x; p; P; d; z 1; Cj).
Replacing z1 by this expression in the demand for any other good i; one obtains
the z   conditional demand for good i :
Ci = i(x; p; P; d; z1; z 1) = 
j
i (x; p; P; d; z 1; Cj): (7)
From this, the third condition is easily derived. It states that, conditional
on Cj ; the demand for any Ci should be independent of any zk (other than z1).
Note that because the unobservables of the demand for Cj now appear in the
demand for Ci; the former is endogenous in the demand for Ci. One obvious
instrument for Cj is the omitted distribution factor z1: Note also that all these
tests require at least two distribution factors and at least two demand functions.
It should also be stressed that one of the distribution factors has to be such that
one can invert one of the demand functions: one therefore needs a continuous
factor and that one demand function is monotonic with respect to that factor.
In this paper, we implement a test of collective rationality based on z  
conditional demands.The main di¢ culty in implementing such a test is the
identication of two variables that can be plausibly labeled as distribution fac-
tors. One of the innovative features of this paper is the fact that we work with
two such variables, which we discuss at length in Section 4. To our knowl-
edge, there are no other such tests in the literature, apart from Bobonis (2009).
However, whilst Bobonis developed some of the same ideas independently, his
implementation is problematic. There are two main issues with his approach.
Firstly, he uses rainfall as a distribution factor without justifying how rainfall
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could a¤ect the intra-household allocation of resources in the Mexican context.
Secondly, the distribution factor z1 he uses to invert the demand function is
an indicator variable indicating assignment to Progresa. A functional inversion
requires a continuous distribution factor. We develop our criticisms in detail in
Appendix A.
There are two parts to our approach to testof the collective model. First, we
show how that, unlike a unitary model, the collective model, once we consider
explicitly the two distribution factors that we described (and, obviously, in
particular the rst one) can predict the impact of PROGRESA upon budget
shares. Of course the impacts will be estimated with some error and one may
argue that the failure to reject the collective model is a lack of power that
comes both from the imprecision of the impact estimates and the imprecision
with which we estimate the models coe¢ cients.
The second part of our approach takes a di¤erent tack and constitutes very
powerful evidence in favour of the collective model. We start from a rejection:
the fact that the coe¢ cient on the PROGRESA dummy is strongly signicant
while (within the unitary model) it should not be. This e¤ect is strong and it
has been documented in many papers, both by us and others (see, for instance,
Schady and Rosero (2008), and Angelucci and Attanasio (2012)). Conditional
cash transfers targeted to women seem to shift Engel curves (rather than causing
a movement in the demand of di¤erent commodities along an Engel curve). We
show that within the framework of the z   conditional demands that use a
distribution factor completely unrelated to PROGRESA (the relative size of
spouses networks), we can explain this shift. In other words, the BBC test
which we implement and that uses the second distribution factor to construct
the z   conditional demands is able to account for the shift in Engel curves
induced by the program. The coe¢ cient on PROGRESA does not just become
insignicant, but it goes down in size. That is, by considering the conditional
demand system we are not just adding noise, we are actually explaining the
shift in the Engel curves.
Notice that the consideration of two distribution factors is crucial here. If
PROGRESA was the only distribution factor, we could not go further than
the rejection of the unitary model and the collective model would saturate the
data. Instead we are testing the hypothesis that under the collective model all
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distribution factors are channelled through a unique index (the Pareto weight
or the sharing rule). This imposes a considerable amount of structure on the
data and could in principle be rejected.
3 PROGRESA and its evaluation surveys
The data set we use is unique for a variety of reasons. First, it is a survey
which has been collected to evaluate the impact of a welfare programme in part
motivated by the desire to change the position of women within rural families
in Mexico. Second, the evaluation design was based on a rigorous randomized
design and involved the collection of a rich and high quality survey. Third, the
nature of the data allows us to construct some credible distribution factors. In
this section, we give some background information on the programme and the
evaluation surveys and present some descriptive statistics.
3.1 PROGRESA.
After a major crisis in 1994/5, and partly in reaction to it, the Zedillo adminis-
tration started an innovative programme, PROGRESA, one of the rst of a new
generation of conditional cash transfersprogrammes that have since become ex-
tremely popular throughout Latin America and eslewhere. PROGRESA, which
was later expanded to urban areas and changed its name into Oportunidades,
was initially targeted to poor and marginalized rural areas and had, as its stated
objectives, to introduce incentives to the accumulation of human capital while
at the same time alleviating short run poverty by providing poor households
with cash conditional on certain investments.
Several practical aspects pertaining to the implementation of the programme
are relevant for our analysis. PROGRESA/ Oportunidades is a conditional cash
transfer programme, in the sense that receipt of the grants is conditional on the
fulllment of criterions further to the fact of being identied as poor in the sense
of the program. The rst set of conditions is related to health seeking behaviour.
Women have to take their young children to health centres and they have to
attend a number of courses organized by the programme. The second set of
conditions is pertinent only for the education component of the grant. Receipt
of this component is conditional on school attendance. In practice, nearly all
children go to primary school. However, as about 60% of children continue
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to secondary school, for households with children who have nished primary
school, the conditions might be binding. Importantly, the grants are paid to
the women, in person, on the basis of fulllment of the programme conditions
during the preceeding period.
PROGRESA is considered a success in many dimensions, and the gold stan-
dard of welfare programmes. Replicated in most of Central and South America,
and even in poor areas of New York city, the programme has been found to lead
to decreases in short term poverty, and to some improvements in health, educa-
tional attainment and investment in human capital.5 It also marks important
changes in the design and delivery of interventions and welfare programmes.
Price subsidies and transfers in kind are replaced by monetary transfers; eval-
uation is conducted from the beginning of the programme; possibilities of ap-
propriation of the programme money are removed by using private banks and
other institutions to deliver the cash, and nally, the transfers are put in the
hands of women. Womens role and involvement in the programme has been
heralded as one of the keys of its success. We come back to this aspect below.
At the start in 1997, 300,000 families were PROGRESA beneciaries. Now,
Oportunidades covers 5 million households, or 25 million individuals represent-
ing 25% of the population. Oportunidades has the largest budget of all human
development programmes in Mexico.
The aim of the programme is to increase human capital investment of the
poorest households in rural Mexico, through investment in education, health
and nutrition. The grants have three components, designed to address these
three aims. The amount of the education grant varies with the gender and age
of the child, from 65 pesos for a boy in third grade to 240 pesos for a girl in
third grade in secondary school (Hoddinott and Skouas, 2004). At the start of
the school year, another component of the education grant is paid to beneciary
households, towards the cost of school supplies. The education grants, therefore,
depend on the number, gender and school level of the children, but are capped
at 490 pesos per month and per household from January to June 1998 rising
5Detailed information on PROGRESA/Oportunidades and its
evaluation can be obtained from the Oportunidades website
(http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/EVALUACION/es/docs/docs2000.php), or Skouas
(2001) or in a recent World Bank Policy Research Report, (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009) Some
evidence on the New York programme, which is relatively less well known, is in Riccio et al,
(2010).
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to 625 pesos from July to December 1999 (Hoddinott and Skouas, 2004). The
grants are paid to the households every two months. For rural households,
the programme constitutes an important component of their income. For the
average beneciary, the PROGRESA grant constituted about 20% of household
income.
3.2 The PROGRESA evaluation sample.
From its start, PROGRESA/Oportunidades was the subject of a rigorous im-
pact evaluation. The evaluation exploited the fact that the expansion of the
programme to the population targeted in the rst phase would take about two
years. The rst phase of the programme was targeted to villages identied as
poor, but in possession of a certain level of amenities in terms of school and
health provision. Of the 10,000 localities included in the rst expansion phase,
506 localities were included in the evaluation sample and 320 of them were ran-
domly chosen to have an early start of the programme (in June 1998), while
the remaining 186 were put at the end of the queueand were excluded from
the programme until the last months of 1999. In the 320 treatedvillages the
households that in the initial (August 1997 and March 1998) surveys qualied as
eligible, started receiving the cash transfers (subject to the appropriate condi-
tionalities) in June 1998, while in the 186 controlvillages, although households
were dened as eligible or non-eligible in the same fashion as in the treatment
villages, no payment was made until November 1999.
In the evaluation sample, extensive surveys were administered roughly every
six months from August 1997 to November 2000. In each of the selected vil-
lages, the survey is a census, which is crucial for the measurement of one of
the variables we use. We use two survey waves, October 1998 and May 1999.
In subsequent survey waves, starting from November 1999, poor households in
control villages start being incorported in the programme and receive part or
all of the transfer they are entitled to by the programme.
The evaluation sample contains 24077 households, of which 61.5% are couples
with any number of children and no other individual living in the household,
6.5% are female headed households, with any number of children and no other
individual living in the household, and 4% are male headed households with
any number of children and no other individual living in the household. The
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remaining 28% of households are neither nuclear families nor single parent or
single individual households; they contain members of extended families or non
blood relatives.
One issue which is prevalent in some areas of Mexico but does not a¤ect
the rural evaluation sample of Oportunidades is that of households in which the
husband works elsewhere and sends remittances. In the Oportunidades rural
evaluation sample, of the 125 674 individuals, 97% live regularly in the house
surveyed, and only 2% live regularly elsewhere, be it to study or work.
Skouas (2001), Hoddinott and Skouas (2004), the World Bank CCT Policy
Research Report (2009), and IFPRI reports (see IFPRI,2006) contain detailed
descriptions and analysis of the e¤ects of PROGRESA/Oportunidades. The
programmes website contains up to date description of the programme and of
its impacts: http://www.oportunidades.gob.mx/index.html (see also the papers
cited in footnote 1).
Our Sample. The evaluation sample, within each village, is a census that
includes both beneciaries and non-beneciaries. As our interest is in using
PROGRESA (to the extent that it was targeted to women) as a distribution
factor, we select a sub sample of households considered as eligible for the pro-
gramme in 1997, residing either in control or treatment villages.6 In order to
work with a homogenous sample in terms of number of decision makers, we also
select households in which there are no more than two adults and any number
of children. The sample contains 14,464 households, of which 7,522 observed in
October 1998 and 6,942 observed in May 1999. Of these, 62.08% (8,979 house-
holds) are in treatment villages and 37.92% (5,485 households) are in control
villages.
6 In August 1997, on average, just about half the households in the targeted localities
turned out to be eligible for PROGRESA. It was subsequently thought that the individual
targeting had been too tight and, in March 1998, a new set of households was made eligible,
so that, on average, about 78% of the households in the targeted localities turned out to be
eligible. However, many of the new eligible households did not receive the transfer, for reasons
that are not completely clear, for some time. To avoid dealing with these problems, in what
follows we focused on the households that were originally dened as poor and that started
receiving the program from its start. As the classication (and re-classication) was done
both in treatmentand controlvillages this does not constitute a problem.
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3.3 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1, we report some descriptive statistics from the sample. In the rst
column, we report the average of each of the relevant variables in the control
sample, while in the second, we report the same average in the treatment sam-
ple. A formal comparison of the two averages shows that the two samples are
balanced, as reported in Behrman and Todd (1999).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics: Means
C T C T
Educ head 2.19 2.23 Household size 5.99 5.99
Educ spouse 2.15 2.16 Nb young children 2.42 2.44
Head indigenous 0.39 0.38 Nb old children 1.57 1.55
Age of head 39.52 39.36 Children in primary 1.25 1.54
Head male 0.96 0.95 Children in sec.pre. 0.30 0.35
Townsize 403.70 387.70 Distance sec. school 2347 2107
Guerrero 0.07 0.10 Dummy secondary school 0.24 0.26
Hildalgo 0.12 0.19 Distance primary school 0.61 0.23
Michoacan 0.13 0.13 Family network 0.42 0.42
Puebla 0.15 0.17 Relatives eat in 0.07 0.08
Queretaro 0.05 0.04 Household members eat out 0.02 0.02
San Luis Potosi 0.14 0.14
Veracruz 0.35 0.23 Nb obs 5485 8979
The sample reects the fact that we are dealing with a very poor popu-
lation. Education of head and spouse, coded as 1 for incomplete primary, 2
for primary, 3 for incomplete secondary, and 4 for secondary and above, are
low. About 60% of the sample has primary education only. The average family
size is 6. Just under 40% of households are of indigenous origin. The sam-
ple is drawn from seven di¤erent states (Guerrero, Puebla, San Luis Potosi,
Michoacan, Queretaro, Veracruz and Hidalgo). About a quarter of the local-
ities have a secondary school in the village. Few households have relatives
or other outsiders eating in the house, and similarly few household members
declare eating outside the house7 . We will control for this in the empirical
7 In fact, the information on whether members of the household eat out is missing for 97%
of households. Similarly, there are some missing values for other variables in the table (for less
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analysis to correct for the direct e¤ect on food expenditure of either. We
will discuss the construction of the family network variable below, in section
4. For now, su¢ ces to say that there does not appear to be a di¤erence
between the mean values of this variable in control and treatment villlages.
3.4 Denition of Commodities and Prices
In what follows, we implement a test of collective rationality on z-conditional
demands. To do this, however, we have to consider at least two distribution
factors (which we discuss below) and two commodities. We study the demand
for the components of total food expenditure, which, in our sample, represents
about 80% of non durable expenditure on average. The PROGRESA data
contains very detailed information on food: the survey collects information on
many narrowly dened commodities and includes information both on expen-
diture and consumption. In computing the shares of the di¤erent foods, we
include a valuation of in kind consumption.
Obviously it would not be feasible to model the demand for several dozens
food items: we therefore aggregate our data to create consumption and budget
shares of 5 di¤erent commodities: (i) starches; (ii) pulses; (iii) fruit and vegeta-
bles; (iv) meat, sh and dairy; and (v) other foods. For each of the individual
commodities that make our ve commodities, we compute consumption so as
to include both what has been bought and quantities obtained from own pro-
duction, payments in kind and gifts. These quantities are valued in pesos using
locality level price information derived from unit values. We take particular
care to avoid duplication induced by household production.8
Unit values are very important for our analysis and are used for two pur-
poses. First, as we mentioned above, we use them to evaluate consumption in
kind. Second, we use them to compute price indexes for each of the composite
commodities. Unit values can be computed for each household that purchases
a given commodity, dividing the value of the purchase by the quantity, as they
than 1% of the sample, information is missing for the variables recordingthe age of the head
of household, the size of the town, the number of children in school, and distance to school.
For family network, there are as many as 15% of issing values, as we discuss below.
8 If a household has consumed some tortilla that were produced in the house, we include
the value of the tortillas (valued at average prices in the town) but do not include the value
of the our that was purchased to make the tortillas.
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are both reported in the survey. Prices for individual commodities at the
locality level are obtained taking the median unit value of the households that
purchased that product in a given locality. We use medians rather than means
to avoid that our estimates of prices are dominated by a few outliers in the
distribution of quantities.
Locality level prices for individual commodities are then used to compute
price indexes for each of the composite commodities, averaging individual level
prices and using as weights locality level budget shares in each of the individual
commodities. Details on the computation of the unit values and their use to
compute price indexes can be found in Attanasio et al. (2009).
Spatial and temporal di¤erences in prices of foods mean it is important
to condition demands on prices. It is worth noting that the prices of foods
decreased considerably between October 1998 and May 1999. As mentioned
above, prices do not seem to have moved di¤erentially between treatment and
control communities. Having said that, however, it is clear that the data present
a considerable amount of price heterogeneity across communities. To estimate
demand functions, therefore, it will be necessary to take into account price
variability even if we were considering a single cross section. The necessity to
take into account variation in prices is compounded by the fact that we use two
separate waves of the survey, October 1998 and May 1999.
3.5 E¤ect of the PROGRESA transfers on budget struc-
ture
Given the availability of the experimental setup, we can estimate the impact of
the programme on total expenditure, on the share of food and on the share of
the ve commodities in food in a very simple fashion and with a minimal set of
assumptions. The strongest of these assumptions is probably that there is no
e¤ect (maybe through anticipation) on the control localities. 9
As the programme was randomly allocated across localities and treatment
and control samples have been proved to be well balanced in terms of baseline
characteristics, the impact of the programme on any given variable can be simply
obtained by comparing averages in treatment and control localities. In this
9Notice that this is di¤erent from the absence of spillover e¤ects on individuals not receiving
the transfer. As the program was randomized across communities, we can allow for spillover
e¤ects of the kind documented in these data by Angelucci and DiGiorgi (2009).
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section, we document the e¤ects of the programme on total consumption, the
consumption of food and the share of food. We use some of these impacts as
inputs in subsequent tests of the theoretical structure. Given a demand system
in which, say, the demand for food depends on total consumption, one could
take the impact of the programme on total consumption, feed it in an estimated
relationship and test whether the model is able to predict the change in food
consumption.
Table 2 shows averages for total non durable consumption, total food con-
sumption and the budget share of food in treatment and control villages, in Oc-
tober 1998 and in May 1999. Not surprisingly, the consumption of non durable
is considerably higher on average in treatment villages than in control villages.
In May 1999, the average di¤erence between non durable consumption in control
and treatment villages is 16%, which, when converted in pesos, is still less than
the amount of the grant, which accounted for about 20-25% of total consump-
tion on average. This di¤erence is estimated with considerable precision (the
standard error is 0.03) and is therefore signicantly di¤erent from zero. The
increase in consumption in treatment villages in October 1998, when the pro-
gramme had only just started, is considerably smaller, but still sizeable at 8%
and statistically di¤erent from zero. Such a modest impact might be explained
by the fact that the programme was not necessarily perceived as permanent
at its inception and by administrative delays in the rst few payments. The
evidence on total consumption is consistent with what has been reported in
the literature. The fact that the increase in total consumption is below the
amount of the grant has been noted an interpreted by Gertler, Martinez and
Rubio-Codina (2012), who present some interesting evidence that the part not
consumed is saved and invested in productive assets (such as small animals)
which allow a permanent increase in consumption in the long run.
The log of expenditure on food is 7% higher in treatment villages than in
control villages in 1998. The di¤erence between treatment and control villages
increases to 16% in 1999. These average impacts of the programme, again
strongly signicant, are remarkably similar to the increases in total non-durable
consumption, implying that the share of food does not change much. Indeed,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that food shares are the same in treatment and
control villages both in 1998 and 1999.
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It is therefore the case that in Mexico, as in other countries where similar
programmes have been operating, the share of food does not decrease after
the transfer and after an increase in total consumption. This is a somewhat
surprising result: if food is a necessity, one would expect its share to decrease
with total expenditure.
Table 2
Comparison of total (log) consumption and the food share
between control and treated villages in October 1998 and May 1999
October 1998 May 1999
Cont. Treat. Di¤. Cont. Treat. Di¤.
ln(cons. exp.) 6:71 6:80 0:08 6:69 6:85 0:16
(0:47) (0:46) (0:03) (0:48) (0:49) (0:03)
ln(food exp.) 6:52 6:59 0:07 6:45 6:61 0:16
(0:46) (0:46) (0:02) (0:47) (0:48) (0:02)
Share of Food 83:40 82:94  0:45 80:04 79:48  0:56
(10:98) (11:37) (0:59) (12:19) (12:25) (0:68)
Nb of obs 2874 4798 2611 4486
Budget shares are multiplied by 100; Nb in parenthesis are standard errors
for di¤erences; standard deviations elsewhere.
Bootstrap clustered by village. 500 replications.
In Attanasio and Lechene (2010), we rule out a number of explanations
for the lack of a signicant decline in the share of food as total consumption
increases, and argue that it might be explained by the fact that targeting the
cash transfer to women might have changed the balance of power within the
household. Here, we want to check whether the restrictions implied by a specic
non-unitary model of intrahousehold resource allocation, the collective model,
hold in the same data and can explain this evidence.
As discussed in Section 2, to perform this test, we need at least two dis-
tribution factors and at least two independent demand functions. The latter
and adding up of expenditure shares imply considering three commodities. One
possibility, therefore, would be to consider the demand for food and the demand
for two other commodities. However, given that food accounts for such a large
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fraction of these familiesbudget and the fact that the quality of the informa-
tion on non food items is not as high as that on food consumption, makes this
strategy di¢ cult to implement in practice. Therefore, in what follows we focus
on the demand for food components. This choice is also motivated by the fact
that the information we have on unit values seem to indicate a large level of
heterogeneity in prices across villages. To test the predictions of the collective
model on a demand system, it will therefore be important to control for prices
and we do not have that information for non-food components of consump-
tion. Finally, as we document below, even when food consumption increases,
the programme seems to induce relatively small changes in the composition of
food consumption. It is therefore particularly interesting to check whether the
demand system we estimate is able to generate this type of patterns.
In table 3, we consider the e¤ect of the programme on the composition of
food consumption. We consider consumption of ve food groups: starches,
wheat and rice; pulses; fruit and vegetables; meat, sh and dairy products; and
nally other foods. Our gures include a valuation of in-kind consumption.
Starches account for 40% of food consumption and, therefore, about 30%
of total consumption. The size of this share is another reminder of the level
of poverty of these households. By contrast, expenditure on meat, sh and
dairy products, which are important sources of proteins, account for only 18%
of total food, while fruit and vegetables, account for 12%. Notice that almost
8% of households report zero consumption of meat, sh and dairy products in
the previous week.
The table also shows the impact of the program on the shares of the ve food
components we are considering. The structure of the budget is not very di¤erent
between control and treatment villages both in October 1998 and in May 1999.
In October 1998, the statistically signicant di¤erences are for pulses, whose
share is 0.80 percentage point lower in treatment villages and for meat, sh and
dairy, whose share is 1.16.percentage point higher. In May 1999, again, statis-
tically signicant di¤erences are not large: the largest di¤erences recorded are
for starches and meat, sh and dairy, respectively -2.30 percentage points and
2.54 percentage points di¤erent between treatment and control villages. As we
see in section 6, estimating the demand for food components on control villages
identies income elasticities much di¤erent from one for several commodities.
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Starches, for instance, are identied as a necessity and meat a luxury. This
implies that the size of the e¤ects in Table 3 is surprisingly small.
Table 3
Composition of the food basket
in control and treated villages in October 1998 and May 1999
October 1998 May 1999 Average %
Cont. Treat. Di¤. Cont. Treat. Di¤. of zeros
Cash transfer 0 268 0 291
Starches 40.26 40.04 -0.21 43.34 41.04 -2.30 0.14
(14.72) (13.73) (0.72) (15.37) (14.79) (0.81)
Pulses 12.82 12.03 -0.80 11.42 10.63 -0.79 3.89
(8.24) (7.72) (0.39) (7.26) (7.47) (0.35)
Fruit and vegetables 13.26 13.65 0.38 10.55 11.53 0.97 2.72
(8.61) (7.86) (0.43) (7.41) (7.38) (0.30)
Meat, sh and dairy 16.03 17.20 1.16 15.99 18.53 2.54 8.23
(12.47) (12.36) (0.64) (12.75) (12.78) (0.65)
Other 17.62 17.08 -0.53 18.69 18.27 -0.42 1.14
(9.93) (8.98) (0.49) (9.94) (10.17) (0.58)
Nb of obs 2874 4798 2611 4486
Budget shares are multiplied by 100; Nb in parenthesis are standard errors for di¤erences;
standard deviations elsewhere. Bootstrap clustered by village. 500 replications
The evidence we have shown in this section conrms that the share of food,
suprisingly, has not declined in correspondence of the increased consumption,
as one would expect if food is a necessity. Furthermore, the composition of the
food basket changes very little even when total food (and total consumption)
change substantially. This is the evidence that a structural demand system
needs to match.
4 Distribution factors
Distribution factors are variables that a¤ect the allocation of resources exclu-
sively by changing the relative weights of the two agents within the households
( and (1  ) in equation (3) above). That is, these are variables that do not
21
enter individual preferences or a¤ect the amount of household resources and yet
play a role in determining equilibrium outcomes. As such, they play a key role
in testing the implications of the collective model. This is particularly so in
the case of the Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori approach we take, which
requires the identication of at least two such factors.
Arguably, the identication of plausible distribution factors constitutes the
main challenge of the exercise we propose and, more generally, it has always been
a stumbling block in the development of the collective model. Theory gives no
guidance as to what constitutes a distribution factor. For many variables that
have been used in the literature, it is often possible to think of reasons why
such a variable could a¤ect preferences and/or budget constraints. One of the
best examples, in the case of couples, is the share of income earned by the wife.
While it is plausible, and documented (Bourguignon et al., 1993; Browning
et al, 1994) that such a variable a¤ects the distribution of resources within the
family, if preferences are non separable between female leisure and consumption,
one might nd that the share of womens income, which is obviously related to
female leisure, appears in the demand system even if the unitary model holds.
The context of PROGRESA and its evaluation data set is unique in several
respects, which makes it possible to construct two convincing candidates for
distribution factors. First, women are randomly selected to participate in the
programme and to receive a cash transfer. For recipients, this leads to an
exogenous increase in the share of the household income controlled by women.
Second, the survey associated with the programme is a census of villages and
it is possible to establish family ties of individuals in the villages. We use
this information to construct a measure of family networks for both spouses,
which we argue inuence individual weights in the intra-household allocation
of resources. The distribution factors we use in what follows are receipt of the
PROGRESA transfer and the relative importance of the husband and wifes
networks of relatives, in terms of size or of nancial prowess.
In this section, we discuss these variables and the extent to which they can
be considered plausible distribution factors. In sections 6.2.2, we document how
the distribution factors a¤ect demand patterns.
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4.1 Receipt of PROGRESA transfer
Eligibility for PROGRESA within a village targeted by the programme was
based on a multi-dimensional assessment of households poverty. Women in
eligible households were entitled to receive a cash transfer. However, within
villages included in the evaluation survey, based on eligibility for the programme,
e¤ective receipt of the cash transfer was randomised across villages.
The motivation for targeting women as recipient of a transfer based on an
assessment of the households poverty, was an explicit attempt, on the part of
the administration of the programme, to improve the condition of women within
the household in rural Mexico. Therefore, unless a woman was controlling 100%
of the household income independently from PROGRESA, receipt of the PRO-
GRESA transfer corresponds to an increase in the share of household income
she controls. Furthermore, because of the randomisation of the programme,
PROGRESA generates an exogenous increase in the share of income controlled
by the wife only for women in some of the surveyed villages.
The share of income controlled by the wife is not an argument of preferences,
and conditional on total income, it does not a¤ect the budget constraint. Thanks
to the exogenous variation in this variable induced by the randomisation of the
programme, PROGRESA assignment constitutes an ideal distribution factor.
Of course, the PROGRESA grant a¤ects the total amount of resources that
a household receives and, therefore, a¤ects the budget constraint. However,
if the demand system one uses is correctly specied, controlling for total ex-
penditure should take care of this increase in resources. Conditional on total
expenditure, whether a household receives or not PROGRESA grants should
make no di¤erence to the allocation of total expenditures among di¤erent com-
modities. In other words, if the standard model is correctly specied, one should
be able to describe how shares change upon receiving PROGRESA grants by
movements along the Engel curve and predict them conditioning on the e¤ect
that the program has on total expenditure.
If, instead, after conditioning on total expenditure (including that induced
by the programme) in a exible and yet theory consistent fashion, PROGRESA
has an impact on commodity shares, it has to be because it shifts the Engel
curves, possibly as a consequence of a shift of Pareto weigths within the house-
holds. Therefore, assignment to PROGRESA is a distribution factor as, within
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a unitary model, it should not a¤ect share equations once the e¤ect on total
expenditure is taken into account.
There is an additional caveat that needs to be made to this argument. As dis-
cussed above, the PROGRESA grant is a conditional cash transfer, where some
conditions, namely the enrollment in school of the household children, might be
related to certain expenditures. However, the argument we have sketched above
holds conditional on school enrolment behaviour. For this reason, in what fol-
lows, we estimate a conditional demand system where we consider expenditure
shares conditional on schooling behaviour.
4.2 Relative importance of family networks.
The second distribution factor we consider is the relative importance of hus-
bands and wifes networks. The main idea behind the use of the relative im-
portance of the networks is the fact that the presence of such networks may
impact, for a variety of possible reasons, on the balance of power within the
household. It is plausible to assume that the position within the household and
the relative weights of husband and wife in the allocation of resources depend,
within the context of the rural villages we are studying, on the relative strength
and inuence of the two extended families in the village. A woman who can
count on a network of siblings and relatives larger, wealthier and more resource-
ful than that of her husband is likely to be in a stronger position in the allocation
of resources within the household. On the other hand, having a relatively larger
and impoverished extended family network can arguably weaken ones position
within the household.
Before justifying fully the use of such a variable as a distribution factor, we
rst describe how we construct it and present some descriptive statistics on it.
To construct the relative importance of the spousess networks we use an idea
developed in an innovative paper by Angelucci, De Giorgi, Rangel and Rasul
(2009) (ADRR09, from now on). ADDR09 use the fact that the PROGRESA
evaluation survey is a census within each locality and the convention of Spanish
last names to map the network of siblings and cousins within each community.
In Spanish speaking countries, individuals get two surnames. The rst is the
(rst) surname of their father, while the second is the (rst) surname of their
mother. As in one of the waves of PROGRESA, both surnames of all individuals
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are available, one can identify the family network for a large fraction of the
sample households. We construct an algorithm which is very similar to that
used by ADDR08 and construct, for each individual in the evaluation sample,
the number of siblings and cousins that are present in the same locality.
We use these data to construct our candidate distribution factor, the relative
importance of husband and wifes networks, in two ways: the size and the wealth
of the networks. The former is the relative number of siblings residing in the
same village, s2=(s1 + s2); where si; i = 1; 2 is the number of siblings of the
wife and the husband respectively. We can also take into account the relative
economic resource of the siblings and not only their number. More specically,
we construct a second index as the ratio of the (food) consumption of the wifes
siblings over the (food) consumption of all siblings (husband and wife), where
consumption is proxying for wealth.
Out of 14,769 households, in 8,848 households either the wife or the husband
or both have siblings present in the village. For these households, the family
network variable is straightforward. For 3,513 households, neither wife nor
husband have siblings living in the village. When both spouses have an identical
positive number of siblings in the village, the relative strength of the family
network F takes the value 1/2. We therefore code 1/2 for households with
no siblings in the village, highlighting the fact that what matters is to have
an equal number of siblings. Finally, for 2,408 households, it is not known
whether husband or wife have siblings in the village.Missing information about
the presence of siblings arises when there is ambiguity about last names.
In Table 4, we report some descriptive statistics for the two measures of
relative family networks importance we have considered in the analysis. The
rst column contains information about the relative number of siblings, and
the second column contains information about the relative wealth of the family
network. This table shows that both variables exhibits a considerable amount
of variation and, therefore, have the potential of capturing variation in the
barganing strength of women in di¤erent households. The correlation coe¢ cient
between the two variables is very high, at 0.9906.
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Table 4
Family networks
Siblings Wealth
Minimum 0 0
Maximum 1 1
25% 0 0
Median 0.5 0.5
75% 0.5 0.57
Mean 0.42 0.42
Std Dev. 0.35 0.35
Correlation 0.9907
Nb missing 2,408
Nb Obs 14,769
Our rst assumption, in using relative family networks as a distribution fac-
tor is that the extent of each spouses network provides some support for that
individual. In the psychological literature, there is some evidence about this.
For instance, Procidano and Heller (1983) discuss three studies that measure
perceived support from networks of family and friends. They report that symp-
toms of distress and psychopatologywere inversely related to both measures
of network support but the relationship was particularly strong for family net-
works. We argue, therefore, that the relative size of the network will a¤ect the
relative position of the spouses in the household.10
As an additional check on whether the relative size of the spouses network
a¤ects the relative position of the spouses in the household, we use some infor-
mation on decision making that is elicited in the evaluation survey. In particu-
lar, there are several questions about who makes decisions about certain issues
(such as making major purchases, taking the children to the doctor, allocating
additional resources), where the possible answers are the wife, the husband
or both. We construct an index of the bargaining power of the woman and
regress it on the relative network size to nd that the two variables seem to
be associated. Incidentally, the same index is also a¤ected by the assignment
to PROGRESA. This evidence (available upon request) supports our choice of
10Several papers in the literature have looked at the e¤ects that family networks have on
various aspects of household behaviour, such as consumption and risk sharing (Altonji et
al., 1992); inter-generational transfers (Altonji et al., 1997; Behrman and Rosenzweig 2006;
Cox and Jakubson, 1995; La Ferrara, 2003); childrens education choices (Loury, 2006); and
non-resident parental investments into children (Weiss and Willis, 1985).
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distribution factors.
For the relative importance of the family network to be a valid distribution
factor, it has to be excluded from preferences and from the budget constraint,
and yet inuence choices. We document in section 6.2.2 the extent to which the
relative importance of the family network inuences choices. Here, we discuss
why it can be excluded from both the budget constraint and preferences.
The number of siblings (of either or both spouses) might have a direct e¤ect
on the demand for food, if siblings share meals. Whilst this would not invalidate
the relative size of the family network as a distribution factor, not accounting for
the direct e¤ect of the number of siblings on the demand for food might would
bias the estimates.To avoid this potential bias and to account for the possible
direct e¤ects that siblings can have on consumption, we control for the number
of relatives who share meals with the household as a determinant of expenditure
shares in the demand system. The survey contains explicit information on this
variable.
There might furthermore be reasons for the size of the spouses networks to
a¤ect the demand system outside of the collective framework. Three reasons
come to mind: altruism, the reciprocity of caring and risk sharing possibilities.
In the presence of altruism, one could argue that a relatively large number of
relatives of, say, the wife, would give more weight to wifes preferences even if
the right model is a unitary one. Moreover, if women care about their siblings,
presumably their siblings care for them. Then, the number of siblings might
a¤ect preferences rather than bargaining, if womens preferences are di¤erent
depending upon the number of siblings they have. Similarly, if there is insurance
between households, the size of family networks might be related to the necessity
of sharing risk.11
We ignore these worries for several reasons. First, these arguments refer to
the size of the network rather than to the relative size of husbands and wifes
networks. Second, if altruism e¤ects are additive these considerations will not
a¤ect the demand system. Third, and especially relevant for risk sharing, we are
considering the e¤ect of distribution factors on expenditure shares, conditional
on the level of total expenditure. The latter is more likely to be a¤ected by the
size of networks, maybe because of risk sharing considerations. For expendi-
11Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) presente evidence that, in South India, women might tend
to marry to far away villages by the need to insure large idiosycnratic risks.
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ture shares, however, standard two stage budgeting considerations make it less
obvious that the relative size of networks would have a direct e¤ect, once one
conditions on total consumption.
5 The Demand System: Methodological issues
The estimation of a demand system on data such as those in the PROGRESA
evaluation survey raises a number of methodological issues, most of which have
been addressed in a number of previous papers, among which Attanasio and
Lechene (2002 and 2010) and Attanasio, Di Maro, Lechene and Phillips (2009,
2013). Specic additional issues arise in the implementation of a test of col-
lective rationality. We review these methodological issues here, starting with
the functional form of the demand system, followed by the endogeneity of total
expenditure and other conditioning variables, namely schooling and the con-
ditioning good. We also discuss why conditioning on schooling enrollment is
crucial in the context of PROGRESA. Finally, we discuss the assumption we
make regarding separability of food from other goods and labour supply, and
the question of endogeneity of prices.
5.1 Functional form of the demand system
In what follows, we model the demand for the components of food consump-
tion ignoring non-food consumption. Specically, we assume that the shares of
the various components of food consumption are a function of total food con-
sumption, demographics, relative prices and, possibly, distribution factors. This
modeling assumption can be justied by two stage budgeting and separability
of food and the rest of consumption. That is, we assume that households rst
decide how much to spend on food and then, conditional on that total, decide
how much to allocate to each food component. Separability between food and
other components implies that this subsystem does not depend on other com-
modities or on relative prices between food and other items. This is a strong
assumption. To test it and possibly relax it, we could include in the demand
system for food either the quantity of non food consumption or the relative price
of non-food. However, we do not have information on prices of non-food items.
Moreover, the expenditure on these items is collected in the survey at a di¤erent
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frequency and with much less detail than for food. As a consequence, the qual-
ity of these data (for which a large number of zeros is reported) is much lower
than for food. We are therefore forced to assume separability and model only
food, which, in any case, constitutes a very large fraction of total consumption
for these households.
The rst step in the analysis is the specication of a demand system. In
the literature on demand, many researchers have estimated a version of the so
called Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) proposed by Banks,
Blundell and Lewbell (1997) as an extension of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)s
AIDS model. Banks, Blundell and Lewbell (1997) show how demand functions
where expenditure shares are a function of relative prices, log total expenditure
and its square can be consistent with utility maximization and how such a
system is the highest rank theory consistent system in the class of perfectly
aggregable systems. The extension proposed by Banks, Blundell and Lewbell
(1997) to allow for quadratic e¤ects is particularly important in our context
where we want to predict changes in expenditure shares related to a relatively
large change in total (food) consumption. In Attanasio, Di Maro, Lechene and
Phillips (2009), we nd that it is important to allow for income responses to
vary with the level of income as permitted by a QUAIDS when estimating a
demand system on the PROGRESA data.
The QUAIDS system can be derived from the maximization of a unitary
utility function, in which case, the coe¢ cients on the vector of prices have to
satisfy a number of restrictions (so that, for instance, the resulting Slutsky
matrix is symmetric and negative denite). In the context of a collective model
with public goods within the family (that is goods that give utility to both
maximizing agents) the shape of the demand functions that would arise is not
obvious even when both agents have a utility function that would give rise to a
QUAIDS system in the unitary case. Browning and Chiappori (1998) show that
symmetry does not hold in the collective model, but that the Pseudo-Slutsky
matrix of price responses is the sum of a symmetric matrix and a rank one
matrix and, in their empirical application, have used the QUAIDS specication
as a useful parametrization of the household demand function.
In our application, following Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Attanasio,
Di Maro, Lechene and Phillips (2009), we specify a QUAIDS, in which expen-
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diture shares are allowed to depend on log total (food) consumption and its
square, on prices and on demographics, as they would in a standard QUAIDS.
We do not impose symmetry of the Slutsky matrix, but only homogeneity and
adding-up.12 We also allow the e¤ect of the two distribution factors we consider
and assume that they enter the demand system additively.
As we saw in section 2, the assumption of e¢ ciency of decisions imposes
restrictions on household demands. For demand choices to be consistent with
collective rationality, distribution factors must a¤ect demands only through an
index. This imposes restrictions which can be satised in a variety of ways.
Suppose, for instance, that in an AIDS or QUAIDS setting, distribution factors
enter the consumption shares equations additively, as we have assumed. The
proportionality restriction is then a restriction on ratio of parameters on pairs
of distribution factors across demands.
The assumption of an additive e¤ect of distribution factors on a (Q)UAIDS is
somewhat arbitrary. Nothing prevents the distribution factors to a¤ect demands
in more complicated manners. For instance, it could be that they enter demands
multiplicatively on total expenditure. In that case the restrictions to be tested
are much more complicated. However, when we tried to interact the distribution
factors we have with expenditure, we did not nd signicant e¤ects. That is, in
our application, distribution factors seem to a¤ect the intercept but not the slope
of the Engel curves we have estimated. We did not investigate the possibility
that distribution factors a¤ect price elasticities. However, our exercise does not
use the restrictions that the collective model imposes on the Slutsky matrix.
The specication of the QUAID system we use is:
wi = 
0
iz + 
0
id+
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
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2
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where wi is the share of commodity i in total expenditure on goods, i = 1; :::n,
x is total expenditure on goods and the price index a(p) is approximated by a
Stone price index where expenditure shares are used as weights. z is a vector
12Browning and Chiappori (1998)s restrictions on the Slutsky matrix from the demand
system of a collective model can also be tested. We leave that exercise, however, for future
work.
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of demographic variables and d a vector of distribution factors. i and i are
vectors of parameters.13
We have assumed that the interceptof equation (8) is a function of various
demographic variables that represent shocks to tastes and of the distribution
factors. The former include the number of young children, controls for the
education of the head of household and his spouse, for the age of the head of
household, for whether the head of household is indigenous and the size of the
town. We also control for household members eating out and for relatives eating
in. The variable ui represents unobserved taste heterogeneity.
Distribution factors also enter the interceptterm. What distinguishes dis-
tribution factors from demographics is the fact that there are additional re-
strictions in the manner in which they enter into the demand functions. These
restrictions are equivalently the proportionality restrictions or the restrictions
on conditional demands, as we saw in section 2.3.
Under the unitary model, the two distribution factors we consider should not
enter the demand system, so that the evidence we present also constitutes a test
of the unitary model. The collective model imposes cross-equation restrictions
on i that we will test. Before doing that, however, we need to tackle a number
of econometric problems. In particular, we need to deal with the endogeneity of
total (food) consumption and of school enrolment, which are important to take
into account as the PROGRESA grant is conditional on schooling.
13 In a QUAIDS, the budget shares take the following form:
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where wi is the share of commodity i in total expenditure on goods, i = 1; :::n, x is total
expenditure on goods and a(p); b(p) and are price indexes dened by the following equations:
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As the focus of the paper is not the estimate of price elasticities, we used the appoximated
expressions in 8. The results are similar when we use the full specication.
31
5.2 Endogeneity of total expenditure and other condition-
ing variables
In what follows, we model the ve components of food as a function of total
food consumption, under the assumption of two stage budgeting. Households
rst decide how much to allocate to food and then, conditional on total food
expenditure, how much to allocate to each food component. The residuals of
our equations can be interpreted as unobservable components of tastes that af-
fect budget shares. If taste shocks to the system that determines total food
consumption are correlated to the unobserved shocks to food components, then
total food will be endogenous in our system. Measurement error in total expen-
diture is also a likely cause of endogeneity.
An instrument for total expenditure often used in the literature is house-
hold income, which implicitely assumes that the measurement error in total
expenditure is uncorrelated with measured income. Under the assumption that
heterogeneity in tastes is the source of endogeneity of total expenditure, income
is a valid instrument if labour supply is separable from consumption. It may be
worthwhile to make explicit and formal these arguments within the framework
of the unitary model. Suppose an individual household maximizes expected
utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint14 :
MaxE0
TX
t=1
(zt; vt)U(qt; et; lt; ut): s:t:
ptqt = xt
xt + St = wt(T   lt) + yt + (1 + r)St 1
where q and p are vectors of commodities and prices, x total expenditure, w
wages, h hours worked, y non labour income, S savings, z some demographic
variables, v is an intertemporal taste shock and e and u are taste shocks that
a¤ect the marginal utility of commodities and labour respectively. By two-stage
budgeting, one could think that rst the consumer chooses total expenditure and
then how to allocate it among di¤erent commodities. If the function U can be
written as:
14The argument can be developed identically in the case of the collective model. We present
it here in the unitary case for ease of exposition.
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U(qt; et; ht; ut) = u(qt; et) + V (ht; ut)
one can decouple the labour supply problem from the determination of total
expenditure and the allocation of the latter across di¤erent commodities. Total
expenditure would still be endogenous if the vector of unobservable taste shocks
e is correlated in the cross section with the intertemporal taste shock v. In such
a situation, total household income wt(T   lt)+yt can be used as an instrument,
if one assumes that the taste shock ut is uncorrelated with the vector et:
If one thinks that such an assumption is too strong, a possible alternative is
to use the component of income that the household takes as given (the wages)
as an instrument for total expenditure. We considered the average agricultural
wage in a village as an instrument. Such a variable would be a valid instrument
(under separability) even when the three taste shocks we consider (u; e and v)
are correlated.
There is an additional reason to consider aggregate wages (rather than indi-
vidual income) as an instrument for total expenditure. Income can be a weak
instrument in a context where large transitory shocks or measurement error may
weaken the relationship between income and total expenditure. This argument
is particularly relevant in the context of developing countries where, while con-
sumption is relatively simple to measure, income (and its many components)
might be di¢ cult to capture. In Attanasio and Lechene (2002) we nd that indi-
vidual level expenditure is better explained by average wages than by individual
income in the cross section.
Obviously, by using average wages, we loose the variability at the individual
level since, in this case, we only exploit the variation across villages. However,
given the high variance of measurement error in income, this is not necessarily a
problem. We nd that once we introduce distribution factors in the model, only
results obtained with the village average agricultural wage are robust across
di¤erent dimensions. We therefore present these results.
If consumption and leisure are not separable in the utility function, income
or wages are not valid instruments for total expenditure. However, in that case,
the entire demand system is mispecied as one should allow for the e¤ect of
hours of work on the marginal utility of consumption. Hours of work should
enter in their own right as a determinant of the demand system. In the context
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we are studying we have decided to assume separability of food consumption
from non food consumption and leisure for two reasons. First, our intuition is
that labour supply behaviour is fairly inelastic in the present context for the
poor households in our sample. Considering it as separable from consumption,
therefore, might not be a bad approximation. Second, as we focus on the role of
Oportunidades as a distribution factor in the demand system, we can appeal to
the fact (reported in the literature, see Skouas (2001) and Skouas and DiMaro
(2008)) that the programme has not a¤ected adult labour supply.
An additional endogeneity issue arises when we condition the demand system
on certain forms of behaviour (such as school enrolment) or when we estimate
the z-conditional demand system in equation 7. In both cases, we use a con-
trol function approach analogous to that we use for taking into account the
endogeneity of total expenditure. That is, we estimate a reduced form for the
endogenous variables which includes variables that are assumed to a¤ect those
choices but not to enter directly the demand system. In the case of school
enrolment, we use variables that represent the cost of schooling (such as the
distance from the nearest school). In the case of the z-conditional demands,
the instrument that identies the model is suggested directly by the theory and
by the test we propose: if the collective model is valid, the distribution factor
used for inverting the demand of one of the commodities is a valid instrument
as, conditional on the demand for commodity j in equation 7, no distribution
factor a¤ects the demand for any commodity i 6= j: This is the sense of the test
in equation 6. The distribution factor used to invert the demand for commodity
j is therefore a valid instrument for Cj in equation 7. We can use the signicance
of the second distribution factor (in our case the PROGRESA/Oportunidades
dummy) as a test of the validity of the model.
5.3 Schooling
Conditional cash transfer programmes impose minimum schooling requirements
for children of the recipient households to receive the largest component of the
grant. The grant amounts are devised with the aim to cover the opportunity
cost of schooling for the household, which is why they vary with the age and
gender of the child. The conditionality might a¤ect consumption behaviour, if
sending children to school imposes related costs, such as for uniforms, shoes or
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books. Conversely, children might be fed in school, which would also have an
impact on the budget share of food and its components. It is thus necessary
to control for schooling of children, over and above controlling for household
composition. However, it could be that unobserved taste for school is correlated
with unobserved taste for certain foods, so that schooling could be endogenous in
the demand system. To allow for this possibility, we instrument schooling with
an indicator for the existence of a secondary school and distance from secondary
school if it is not in the village (and zero if it is in the village). The average
distance to a secondary school is 2.2 kilometers, with a maximum distance of
14 kilometers. In only about 25% of villages is there a secondary school.
The assumption that we are making is that the distance to a secondary school
a¤ects schooling decisions but does not a¤ect the structure of expenditures
between foods, conditional on the size of the village and the other controls
in the demand system. As is always the case, it is not possible to test the
identication restriction that we are using. One possible worry, for instance,
is that the presence of a school in a nearby village proxies for other variables
(such as the presence of a market) that might a¤ect demand. However, we feel
that conditional on village size and the other variables (including prices) we
are considering, the information on the distance to a secondary school can be
excluded from the demand system.
Primary school is not considered as endogenous in the demand system. Pri-
mary school attendance is high (over 90%) and not a¤ected by the programme.
However, we follow previous literature on PROGRESA in that we condition on
the number of children attending primary school in the demand system, for the
reasons mentioned above.
5.4 Additional issues
There are two additional methodological issues worth mentioning briey. The
rst one has to do with separability and the collective model. When we specify a
demand system for foods arising from a unitary model, we call upon an assump-
tion of separability between food and non food to justify conditioning quantities
of food components on total food consumption and prices of these food com-
ponents, but not, say, on prices of other non durables. When considering the
collective model, however, assuming that individual preferences are separable
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between food and the rest is not su¢ cient to get a household demand system
for food components that does not depend on non-food relative prices. To ob-
tain such a specication we need to make an additional assumption, namely that
the sharing rule or Pareto weights of the individuals in the household welfare
function does not depend on the prices of non-food items. This is true if the
household decides on the allocation of the total between food and non food,
and then on the allocation between foods. Following this argument, the Pareto
weight, or the sharing rule for this problem will depend on the prices of the
foods, and the total expenditure on the same, and the distribution factors if
any.
Analogous considerations apply to the issue of how to treat labour supply.
In our application we have assumed that leisure and consumption enter the
utility function in a separable fashion. This allows to ignore labour supply
choices and consider the income process that would get from solving the labour
supply problem as a given exogenous process. Implicit in this choice is the
assumption that wages do not enter the individual weights. The main motivation
for assuming separability of consumption and leisure was the desire to keep the
discussion simple, the focus of the paper on the e¤ect of distribution factors on
expenditure shares and the fact that, as documented, for instance, in Skouas
(2001) and Skouas and DiMaro (2008), Oportunidades had no impact on adult
labour supply.
The second methodological issue is the possible endogeneity of prices. Sup-
pose that tastes shocks are correlated within villages. In this case, it could be
that in a village where people like meat a lot, the price of meat will be high and
yet, there will be a high demand for meat. One way around this would be to
instrument prices with supply conditions (number of shops, distance from big
markets, etc...). We do not have this information, and we therefore make the
assumption that this e¤ect is absent. We should also note that our main interest
is in the e¤ect that the introduction of PROGRESA has on the demand system
and that studies that have looked at the e¤ect of PROGRESA on prices (such
as Angelucci and DeGiorgi, 2009) have not found any e¤ects.
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6 Empirical results
We are now ready to present our empirical results. We divide this section in
three parts. First we present results for the rst stage regressions we estimate to
deal with the endogeneity of total food consumption and school enrolment. We
then discuss our estimates of the demand systems and informally compare the
predictions implied by the model for the impact of the grant on consumption
shares. Finally, we present the formal tests of the restrictions of the collective
model.
6.1 First stage regressions
As we discussed in the previous section, there are two potentially endogenous
variables in the demand system: total expenditure on food and number of chil-
dren in secondary and "preparatoria" school. Table 5 shows the rst stage
regressions for the log of total expenditure and the number of children in sec-
ondary school and "preparatoria" school. These regressions include both the
instruments and the other conditioning variables that enter the second stage.
In the rst two columns of the table, the instrument for total expenditure is the
village average agricultural wage, whilst in the last two columns is household
income. The other instruments we use (for secondary school enrolment) are an
indicator of the presence of a secondary school and the distance to the secondary
school.
The results reported in Table 5 refer to the entire sample, which includes
both treatment and control localities. Results on the control sample, for which
we report estimates of the demand system in the next section, are substantially
similar and are available upon request.
The instruments have the expected e¤ects in the rst stage regressions. In
the equation for log total expenditure, we nd that both village median agri-
cultural wage and income have power in explaining total food expenditure and
that both the linear and the quadratic terms are important. As for the equa-
tion for secondary school enrolment, we nd that distance to secondary school
inuences the number of children attending secondary school in the expected
direction.
The rst stage results are also conditional on the distribution factors we
consider: namely an indicator for the receipt of PROGRESA and the relative
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family network size ratio. The rst stage results obtained with the alternative
measure of relative family network, based on consumption, as well as those
obtained with the perceived power index, are not di¤erent from those presented
in Table 5.
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Table 5
First stage regression for total expenditure and schooling
Variable Tot.Exp. Ch.High Sch. Tot.Exp. Ch.High Sch.
Instrument Village wage Income
ln(instr) -0.37 0.462 -0.15 0.12
(0.09) (0.12) (0.07) (0.011)
ln(instr)^2 0.18 -0.17 0.0016 -0.005
(0.03) (0.05) (0.005) (0.008)
Receipt of PROGRESA 0.10 0.055 0.10 -0.011
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
Family network size -0.024 -0.003 -0.026 -0.011
(0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.018)
Distance high school. -0.00 -0.02 0.001 -0.02
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Indicator high school. -0.000 0.057 0.00 0.045
(0.01) (0.017) (0.014) (0.02)
Children in primary school 0.08 0.078 0.07 0.067
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Townsize -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Nb. young. children. 0.02 -0.035 0.023 -0.037
(0.003) (0.04) (0.003) (0.005)
Educ. spouse -0.018 0.004 -0.018 0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Head indigenous -0.079 -0.004 -0.063 -0.008
(0.01) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016)
Head age 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.012
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educ. head -0.000 0.014 -0.007 0.015
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Relatives eat in 0.007 -0.01 0.003 -0.01
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Hhld member eat out 0.012 0.049 -0.012 0.059
(0.02) (0.03) (0.023) (0.033)
R2 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.08
N 12155 9364
F(2,12134) F(2,9343)
Test of instrument for total expenditure 24.90 7.53 22.26 6.91
p  value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test of instrument for schooling 0.02 43.68 0.07 28.17
p  value 0.98 0.00 0.93 0.00
Prices of foods and a constant are also included. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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6.2 Demand System
As mentioned above, the demand system is specied as a QUAIDS, which allows
both linear and quadratic terms in the log of total consumption of food. This
variable and schooling are treated as endogenous and we use a control function
approach to deal with this issue. In particular, we add to the equations we
estimate a second degree polynomial in the residuals of the rst stage regres-
sions reported in Table 5. The signicance of rst stage regression residuals in
the demand system indicates a strong rejection of exogeneity of both total ex-
penditure on food and secondary school enrolment in the structure of the food
budget. In what follows, we present the results obtained with the agricultural
wage as an instrument for total consumption of food. The results obtained with
income as instrument are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the wage,
but they are less precise.
6.2.1 Demand system without distribution factors
We rst estimate the demand system without considering any distribution fac-
tors. This system, which corresponds to equation (8) above, includes demo-
graphic variables (household head age, the number of young chidlren, an indi-
cator for indigenous head, education of the head of household and the spouse,
townsize, and information about household members eating out and relatives
eating with the household considered). It also controls for the number of chil-
dren in secondary and primary school (with the former being considered as
endogenous), and prices. In Table 6, however, we report only the coe¢ cients
on the linear and quadratic log total expenditure terms; the coe¢ cients on the
other variables are available upon request.
The rst three columns of Table 6 are obtained using information from house-
holds in the control villages only. The rst two columns contain the estimates
of the coe¢ cients (and their standard errors) on total consumption of food and
its square for the ve food components we consider in the demand system. In
the third column, we give the value of the 2 test of joint signicance of the two
income terms in the equation of each good (and its p-value).
From the results in the rst three columns of table 6, we see that the income
e¤ects estimated in control villages di¤er signicantly from zero for starches,
fruit, meat and other foods. The estimated coe¢ cients indicate that starch is a
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necessity over most of the range of total food expenditure, while fruit and meat
are luxuries over most of the range. The category "other foods" appears to be
a necessity at low levels of total expenditure and a luxury at high levels of total
food consumption.The relationship between pulses and total food consumption
is not precisely estimated and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ -
cients on log consumption and its square are jointly zero, indicating that the
share of expenditure on pulses does not change with total food consumption.
The next exercise consists in re-estimating the same demand system, pooling
control and treatment households. The results of coe¢ cients on log total food
consumption (and its square) are shown in columns 4 and 5 of table 6, while we
report the 2 test of the joint signicance of these coe¢ cients in Column 6.
The treatment consists in the injection of (relatively) large amounts of cash
in the budget of treated households. As the treatment was allocated randomly,
if the structural model we estimated was well specied, including the treated
households in the estimation sample should not make much di¤erence to the
point estimates of the income e¤ects, but should increase their precision. What
we nd, however, is entirely di¤erent. Rather than increasing precision, increas-
ing the sample size by incorporating poor households from the treated villages
leads to changes in the values of the coe¢ cients. The estimated coe¢ cients
change substantially and in the case of starch, fruit, meat and other foods, the
curvature of the relationship between total expenditure and the budget share
changes. If we believed these estimates, we might be led to conclude that starch
is a necessity at low level of expenditure, then a luxury and that fruit and meat
become necessities at high level of total expenditure. Since we have no reason
to presume that the nature of goods should be di¤erent in the preferences of
households in treated villages, we interpret this lack of stability as indicating
that the model is not able to capture the relationship between total expenditure
and the structure of the budget following the cash transfers.
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Table 6
Income e¤ects, demand system with no distribution factors
(1) Control villages (2) Control and treatment villages
Tot. Food Tot.Food^2 2(2) Tot. Food Tot.Food^2 2(2)
(P > 2) (P > 2)
Starch 5.08 -0.56 12.8 -9.02 0.89 18.00
(2.30) (0.24) (0.00) (2.36) (0.24) (0.00)
Pulses -0.35 0.04 0.39 -0.95 0.09 3.59
(1.13) (0.12) (0.67) (1.09) (0.11) (0.03)
Fruit -1.66 0.19 10.66 5.35 -0.53 28.55
(1.07) (0.11) (0.00) (1.05) (0.11) (0.00)
Meat -0.96 0.12 7.77 3.26 -0.31 13.23
(1.60) (0.17) (0.00) (1.75) (0.18) (0.00)
Other foods -2.11 0.21 2.73 1.37 -0.14 0.43
(1.32) (0.14) (0.07) (1.56) (0.16) (0.65)
Nb obs 5485 14769
The demand system is as in equation 8 and controls are included for children in primary school,
children in secondary school, nb of young children, town size, education of head and spouse, age of head,
indigenous head dummy, relatives eating in, and household, members eating out, as well as homogenous
prices. Average agricultural wage as instrument for total expenditure; indicator for the presence of a school
and distance to school as instrument for children in secondary school.
Bootstrap clustered by village, 500 replications.
We further substantiate our interpretation of these results, by using the
estimates from Table 6 and the estimated experimental impact on total food
consumption (and schooling) to predict the impact of the PROGRESA grant
on the shares of the ve commodities that we are considering. We do this in
Tables 7 and 8, respectively for October 1998 and May 1999.
In the rst column of the tables, we report the average impact of the program
as estimated comparing treatment and control communities. We will be referring
to this impact as the actualimpact, as it is based on experimental evidence. As
discussed in section (3.5), what is most notable about the actual impacts of the
cash transfers on the structure of the budget is how small they are. The budget
share of starch is 2.30 percentage point lower in treated households than it is in
control households in May 1999. This is consistent with the fact that starch has
been found to be a necessity. The share of pulse also decreases signicantly at
both dates, albeit not dramatically. The shares of fruits and especially of meat
increase.
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In the second column of Tables 7 and 8, we use the estimates of the demand
system estimated using only data from control villages (and reported in the rst
two columns of Table 6) to predict the impacts of the program on expenditure
shares. In the third column of Tables 7 and 8, we use the estimates of the
demand system obtained from both treatment and control villages. In terms
of point estimates, the predictions are of poor quality for all the goods at both
dates. However, note that since the actual impacts are mostly zero, we are
trying to predict zero, which can arise also through lack of precision.
In the last two columns of Tables 7 and 8, we test the hypothesis that the
actual impacts of the programme on expenditure shares, as reported in the
rst column of the two tables, are statistically di¤erent from those predicted
in columns 2 and 3, respectively. The standard errors of these di¤erences are
obtained bootstrapping both the estimates of the actual impacts, those of the
demand system and of the predictions. The standard errors are clustered at the
village level.
We nd that in many cases, we reject the null that the actual and predicted
impacts are the same. On the other hand, in a number of instances, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that these predictions are the same as the actual impacts.
This result, however, is mainly due to the low precision of our estimates based
on the demand system, whose variability reects both the variability of the
estimates of the impact on total consumption and that of the coe¢ cients of the
demand system.
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Table 7
Actual and predicted e¤ects of the program on the budget structure
No Distribution factors - October 1998
Actual Predicted impacts Di¤. btw actual. impact and
impact on controls pooling treated on controls pooling treated
and controls and controls
Starch -0.21 -1.97 -3.80 -1.75 -3.59
(0.72) (1.15) (1.84) (1.26) (1.80)
Pulses -0.80 0.20 -0.92 1.00 -0.12
(0.39) (0.36) (0.46) (0.57) (0.61)
Fruit 0.38 0.99 2.17 0.61 1.78
(0.43) (0.51) (1.00) (0.62) (0.96)
Meat 1.16 1.51 2.43 0.35 1.27
(0.64) (0.73) (1.01) (0.78) (0.97)
Other foods -0.53 -0.73 0.12 -0.20 0.66
(0.49) (0.52) (0.46) (0.68) (0.68)
Predictions are obtained from 1998 data. Bootstrap clustered by villages; 500 replications.
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8
Actual and predicted e¤ects of the program on the budget structure
No Distribution factors - May 1999
Actual Predicted impacts Di¤. btw actual. impact
impact on controls pooling treated on controls pooling treated
and controls and controls
Starch -2.30 -6.36 -5.14 -4.06 -2.83
(0.81) (1.80) (2.25) (1.73) (2.45)
Pulses -0.79 0.59 -1.71 1.37 -0.92
(0.35) (0.75) (0.74) (0.80) (0.83)
Fruit 0.97 2.85 2.84 1.88 1.87
(0.30) (0.74) (1.07) (0.73) (1.03)
Meat 2.54 3.76 4.24 1.23 1.71
(0.65) (1.18) (1.35) (1.07) (1.30)
Other foods -0.42 -0.85 -0.24 -0.43 0.18
(0.59) (0.91) (0.78) (0.98) (1.00)
Predictions are obtained from 1999 data. Bootstrap clustered by villages; 500 replications.
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
These estimates are obtained taking the estimated demand system (without
distribution factors) as a structural relationship and inputing into it the impact
that the programme has on total food consumption and schooling. However, it
might be the case that the demand system is not a structural relationship, if
other features of the programme might be relevant, such as the fact that the
transfer is put in the hands of women. We will now investigate whether this is
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the case by introducing distribution factors in the demand system.
6.2.2 Demand system with distribution factors
We now re-estimate the demand system allowing the expenditure shares to be
a¤ected by two distribution factors: the receipt of the PROGRESA transfer and
the variable measuring the relative size of wife and husband family networks
that we discussed above. The consumption shares we estimate correspond to
equation (8) and include the same demographic variables used when estimating
the demand system reported in Table 6. We enter the rst distribution factor
as an indicator which equals to one if the household lives in a village targeted
by PROGRESA (and therefore receives the programme).15
The second distribution factor is crucial for the test of the collective model
that we report below. We therefore investigate the possibility that it enters
non-linearly the consumption shares equations. Allowing for the presence of
quadratic (or higher order) terms is important for two reasons. First, the theory
is silent about the specic form in which this (or any other) distribution factors
enters the share equations. Second, the test of the collective model we propose
requires that there is at least one commodity for which one of the distribution
factors enters monotonically, so that the relationship can be inverted.
In Table 9, we report the estimates of the coe¢ cients on the PROGRESA
dummy and on the family network size and its square that we obtain on the
whole sample using the agricultural average wage as an instrument for total food
consumption. This set of results is representative and robust across di¤erent
specications. The main nding is that, while the coe¢ cient on the PROGRESA
dummy is signicantly di¤erent from zero in four out of ve share equations, the
coe¢ cient on the quadratic terms of the family size network is never signicantly
di¤erent from zero16 . The results were virtually identical when we used the index
based on the relative wealth of husband and wifes networks. We also tried
higher polynomial for the relative network variable and we could not identify
any signicant higher order terms. We also notice that, in the case of Meat, not
15Unlike in urban areas, take up of the programme among eligible is virtually universal.
16When we estimate the demand system on single mothers, we nd that the treatment
indicator is not signicant in any of the foods, thus conrming that it is a valid distribution
factor, since it plays a role when there are two decision makers, but not when there is only
one. These results, that are available on request, conrm the nding of Shady and Rosero
(2008).
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only the coe¢ cient on the quadratic term is not signicantly di¤erent from zero,
but the point estimates of the two coe¢ cients imply an increasing relationship
between the share and the relative network size variable.
Table 9
E¤ect of distribution factors on the consumption shares
Starch Pulses Fruit Meat Other foods
Treatment 0.035 0.0022 -0.017 -0.019 -0.0016
(0.010) (0.0062) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Family network size -0.015 0.0045 0.014 0.007 -0.010
(0.012) (0.0063) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
Family network size^2 0.00027 -0.0043 -0.004 0.003 0.006
(0.012) (0.0064) (0.006) (0.01) (0.007)
Nb obs 12361
Instrument for total food is village average wage. Bootstrap clustered by villages,
500 replications. Standard errors in parentheses.
Given these ndings, we decided to use a specication of equation (8) that
is linear in relative network sizes. In Table 10, we report the estimates we
obtain for the coe¢ cients on the two distribution factors and for the linear and
quadratic log total food consumption. Several comments are in order. First,
both distribution factors are strongly signicant. The PROGRESA dummy
is signicantly di¤erent from zero at standard levels in four of the ve share
equations. The relative size of family networks is also signicantly di¤erent from
zero in three of the ve shares equations. Notice that under the unitary model,
neither of these variables should enter the demand system. The linearity of the
relationship between shares and the relative size of the family networks implies
that we can use any of these relationships to perform the inversion described in
Section 2.3 and construct the z-conditional demands.
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Table 10
E¤ect of distribution factors on the budget, inst:wage
Starch Pulses Fruit Meat Other foods
Treatment 0.035 0.0022 -0.017 -0.019 -0.0015
(0.01) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Family network size -0.015 0.00 0.01 0.009 -0.004
(0.005) (0.002) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.003)
ln Tot. Exp.Food -8.96 0.037 4.26 3.39 1.27
(2.52) (1.09) (1.06) (1.89) (1.65)
ln Tot.Exp.Food^2 0.88 -0.01 -0.42 -0.32 -0.14
(0.26) (0.001) (0.11) (0.20) (0.17)
Nb obs 12361
Estimates of some of the coe¢ cients of Equation (8).
Bootstrap clustered by village
As for the coe¢ cients on total log food consumption, the quadratic e¤ects
are strongly signicant in three of the ve foods. Starches, as before, are a
necessity over most of the range of food consumption, as are pulses and other
foods, while meat and fruit are luxuries.
In the next sub-section, we present the formal test of the restrictions im-
plied by the collective model. One more informal but informative way to check
whether our specication ts the data generated by the PROGRESA experi-
ment, which explicitly changed the control of resources within the family in a
controlled way, is to check whether the specication of the demand system in
equation (8) is able to predict the changes in consumption shares reported in
Table 4. We, therefore, re-do the exercise reported in Tables 7 and 8, but us-
ing the coe¢ cients of the demand system that includes the distribution factors
we have considered. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 11 and
12. In column (1) of these tables we report again the experimentalaverage
impact. In column (2) the prediction of the demand system that incorporates
the distribution factors and, in column (3) the di¤erence between the two. As
in Tables 7 and 8, the standard errors of all these estimates are computed by
bootstrapping all the relevant components, with clustering at the village level.
The results we obtain now are much di¤erent from those in Tables 7 and
8. All predicted impacts are of the same sign as the observed changes in con-
sumption shares. Most importantly, they are considerably closer to the actual
experimental impacts and the di¤erence is never statistically di¤erent from zero.
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Table 11:
Actual and predicted impacts of the program on
the commodity shares with distribution factors October1998
Impacts Di¤erence
Actual Predicted
Starch -0.21 -0.33 -0.11
(0.72) (1.75) (1.59)
Pulses -0.80 -0.39 0.41
(0.39) (0.47) (0.36)
Fruit 0.38 0.32 -0.06
(0.43) (0.86) (0.74)
Meat 1.16 0.49 -0.67
(0.64) (1.13) (0.89)
Other foods -0.53 -0.10 0.43
(0.49) (0.51) (0.50)
Predicted impacts computed using the model in Table 10.
Bootstrap clustered by villages, 500 replications.
Table 12:
Actual and predicted impacts of the program on
the commodity shares with distribution factors May 1999
Impact Di¤erence
Actual Predicted
Starch -2.30 -1.88 0.42
(0.81) (1.83) (1.98)
Pulses -0.79 -0.91 -0.13
(0.35) (0.45) (0.38)
Fruit 0.97 1.00 0.03
(0.30) (0.84) (0.80)
Meat 2.54 2.45 -0.09
(0.65) (1.12) (0.88)
Other foods -0.42 -0.66 -0.24
(0.59) (0.57) (0.66)
Predicted impacts computed using the model in Table 10.
Bootstrap clustered by villages, 500 replications.
We interpret this evidence as indicating that there is scope, in the context
of the PROGRESA programme, for investigating the role played by features of
the programme which cannot be rationalised within the standard framework of
unitary household choices, but need to be accounted for. In the next subsection,
we turn to the formal test of the collective model. We will not comment here
on other aspects of the estimation of the demand system. Interested readers
are referred to Attanasio, Di Maro, Lechene and Phillips (2009 and 2013) for
in depth analysis of income and price responses and welfare analysis in this
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context.
6.3 Test of E¢ ciency
The test for collective rationality we discussed above requires that we can ob-
serve at least two goods and two distribution factors. One aspect which is
crucial in the analysis is that the distribution factor and the good which is used
for the test have to have a statistically signicant link, otherwise the test has
no power. This is not a problem here, since the relative size of husband and
wifes networks is signicant in the demands for three goods out of ve. Similar
considerations apply to the results that we obtain with the reported power and
the alternative measure of relative networks.
The good we use for the test of conditional rationality is animal protein,
or meat, sh and dairy. Both distribution factors signicantly inuence the
demand for animal protein, and the relationship between demand and the family
network is monotonic.
Table 13 gives the results of test of collective rationality using z-conditional
demand with animal proteins as the conditioning good and relative family net-
work size as the distribution factor used to invert the demand for meat. To
deal with the endogeneity of the conditioning good, we use, once again, a con-
trol function approach, where the identifying instrument, consistently with the
collective model, is the distribution factor that is used to invert the demand for
the conditioning good. In the Table, we only report the coe¢ cient on the PRO-
GRESA dummy and, in the case of the conditional demands, the coe¢ cient on
meat and the coe¢ cient on the residual for the rst stage regression for meat,
denoted with umeat. For each good in the table, we also report the results for
the unconditional estimation.
The results are striking: in the unconditional demand system, the treatment
dummy is signicant for three goods. In the z conditional demand system
it is nowhere signicant. Moreover, it is not because of an increase in the
standard errors that the estimates of the treatment dummy become statistically
insignicant: rather the point estimates drop, for three of the four commodities,
dramatically. There results imply that we cannot reject the collective model.
We should note that the test of the collective model based on z   conditional
demands is equivalent to a test of the proportionality restrictions.
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Table 13
Collective rationality test with family network distribution factor,
Starches Pulses Fruit Other foods
Uncond. z cond. Uncond. z cond. Uncond. z cond. Uncond. z cond.
Treat 0.035 0.004 0.0022 0.0023 -0.017 0.004 -0.0015 -0.010
(0.01) (0.027) (0.006) (0.038) (0.004) (0.06) (0.006) (0.013)
Meat -1.61 0.007 1.07 -0.47
(1.57) (2.43) (3.76) (0.70)
umeat 0.92 -0.13 -1.11 0.32
(1.57) (2.43) (3.76) (0.69)
u2meat 0.15 0.00 -0.05 -0.10
(0.06) (0.027) (0.035) (0.04)
Nb obs 12361
Instrument for total food consumption: average agricultural wage.
Bootstrap clustered by villages, 500 replications.
7 Conclusions
The unitary model has been rejected a number of times. In this paper, we
go beyond that result and test some of the implications of one of the main
alternatives to the unitary model, the so-called collective model that postulates
that, however intrahousehold allocations are achieved, they are such that there
is no waste of resources and are therefore e¢ cient.
We implement a test of the collective model that has been recently proposed
by Bourguignon et al (2009) which requires the analysis of the demand for at
least two commodities and at least two distribution factors. The idea is relatively
simple: an important implication of the collective model and e¢ ciency is that
distribution factors only a¤ect demand through the Pareto weights that denes
the e¢ cient allocation. If this is the case, then two or more distribution factors
have to enter proportionally or, equivalently, if the relationship between the
demand for one good and a distribution factor is monotonic, one can condition
on that commodity and explain awayall other distribution factors.
We apply this test to the context of rural Mexico and on the data set col-
lected to evaluate the conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA. This data
set is ideal for a variety of reasons. First, the programme is targeted to women
with the explicit purpose of changing the balance of power within the house-
holds that receive it. The programme itself, whose allocation is randomized
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across localities within the evaluation sample, is an ideal distribution factor.
Second, the fact that the evaluation factor is a census within each village gives
researchers the opportunity to map out the family network and allows us to
construct an additional distribution factor, the relative size of husband and wife
family networks. This measure is continuous and turns out to be an important
determinant of the demand for food.
We use the PROGRESA data to estimate a state of the art demand system
both with and without the distribution factors we considered. We rst conrm
that the demand system we estimate without distribution factors is not stable
and is unable to predict the impact of the programme on consumption shares.
The distribution factors we consider are not only signicant, but seem to enter
in a fashion which is not inconsistent with the implications of the collective
model. Moreover, we are able, with these distribution factors, to predict the
impacts of the programme much better than the standard unitary model.
In the process of testing the collective model, our results also o¤er an ex-
planation for a phenomenon that has been observed in the context of a number
of conditional cash transfer programs, namely the fact that in the face of the
large change in total consumption that follows the injection of cash implied by
these programs, the structure of consumption, that is how total consumption
is allocated to di¤erent commodities changes in ways that are hard to reconcile
with perceived wisdom or even with the estimates of state of the art demand
systems. We suggest that this might be due to a violation of the unitary model
and to the fact that the cash transfers delivered by these programmes are tar-
geted to women. Furthermore, we show that the deviations from the standard
model are not inconsistent with the collective model.
Our results are important because they constitute the rst test of this na-
ture of the collective model in a context where the intrahouseholds allocation
of resources is certainly salient, as witnessed by the attempt on the part of the
government, to change it. Moreover, the fact that we do not reject the implica-
tions of the collective model is important because it points to a specic model
of intrahousehold resources that can be used to study the household behaviour
and establish the consequences of di¤erent policies. In future work, we plan to
test additional restrictions of the collective model, and in particular those on
the demand price elasticities.
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9 Appendix A. A discussion of Bobonis (2009)
Bobonis (2009) developed, independently from us, some of the same ideas we
use in our paper. In particular, Bobonis wants to implement the test developed
by Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (2009, henceforth BBC09) using the
same data we use, the evaluation data set for the PROGRESA program. Un-
fortunately, Boboniss implementation of the test is severely awed in many
dimensions, so that his results are di¢ cult if not impossible to interpret. In this
Appendix, we explain our criticisms of Bobonisapproach.
The main issues we have with Bobonispaper are:
1. The use of rainfall as a distribution factor.
2. The use of PROGRESA as the distribution factor to invert the conditional
demands.
3. A variety of technical problems with the estimation of the demand system.
We discuss these issues in turn.
1. Rainfall as a distribution factor. Bobonis uses village level rainfall (or
rather an indicator dummy that takes a value of 1 if rainfall exceeds a certain
level) as a distribution factor, which we nd most puzzling. Bobonis provides
little conceptual justication for the use of rainfall as a distribution factor.
He variously states that rainfall is a valid distribution factor because it is a
proxy for "joint household income" or for [shocks to] "household income that
are not exclusive of female partners". As we mention in section 4, a distribution
factor is a variable which does not a¤ect preferences and budget constraints and
yet a¤ects choices, through an e¤ect on the decision process. There are thus
two separate questions, one conceptual and the other empirical. First, under
what assumptions can partner specic and jointly held incomes constitute valid
distribution factors? Second, how does rainfall a¤ect incomes in the context
considered?
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It is generally accepted that partner specic incomes, or rather the share of
household income controlled by each partner in the total of household income is
a valid distribution factor, if preferences are separable between consumption and
the activities that generate those income. Under such an assumption income
shares do not a¤ect the marginal utility of consumption and, for a given level of
household resources, partner specic incomes do not enter the budget constraint.
Furthermore, whether income shares inuence the allocation of resources by the
household can be empirically tested, so as to establish that partner specic
incomes do indeed a¤ect choices, for a given level of household income.
Bobonis makes implicitly the assumption of separability (which we will not
take issue with) and assumes that total household resources, y; can be decom-
posed as:
y = yA + yB + y0
where yA is income controlled by the wife, yB income controlled by the husband
and y0 is what he calls jointly held income. Under the unitary model (and
income pooling) only the total should matter. Notice that in order to have
two distribution factors out of this decomposition, it is crucial to have three
components of income. If there were only two (for instance if y0 was uniformly
zero), one could only obtain one distribution factor: the share of womens income
in the total.
The argument for PROGRESA assingment to be a valid distribution factor
is that for a constant y; assignement to PROGRESA changes yA=y: The argu-
ment for rainfall to be a valid distribution factor would have to be that, for a
constant y; rainfall changes yB=y (or, identically, (y0=y) = (y   yA   yB)=y): It
seems Bobonis assumes that rainfall a¤ects only one of the three components of
income, namely either yB or y0:In other words, the aim is to capture exogenous
movements in yA by an indicator of whether the household is a PROGRESA
beneciary and movements in y0 by rainfall shocks.
While the former strategy is acceptable, there is no reason to believe that
rainfall a¤ects only y0 and not both y0 and yB or even yA; yB and y0: In other
words, one can get independent variation in yB=y if one can nd some source
of independent variation in y0: In Boboniss sample, unearned income is zero
for 65% of the sample, social insurance for 87%, prots are zero for 95% of the
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sample and agricultural prots are missing for 96% of the sample. There is no
second distribution factor.
Let us examine nonetheless the second question we need to consider: how
does rainfall a¤ects incomes in the context of rural Mexico. As we have shown
in the discussion above, for rainfall to be a distribution factor, it needs to have
di¤erential e¤ects on di¤erent sources of income, as well as inuencing choices,
independently from its e¤ect on total expenditure or household income. In the
paper, there is no evidence about the di¤erential e¤ects of rainfall on di¤erent
components of income or indeed of independent variation of yB and y0 across
households or villages.
Empirical justication for the use of rainfall and Progresa assignment as
distribution factors is provided in section IV-C, page 468, of the paper by show-
ing that these two variables predict total expenditure. But this argument is
completely inconsequential. These variables might be a¤ecting consumption
because of their e¤ect on total resources. The point is to establish whether
they move di¤erent components of income, controlled by the two spouses, dif-
ferently and independently. In the case of PROGRESA this is obvious because
the cheques are given to the mothers. In the case of rainfall there is no such
evidence. On page 474, paragraph 1, Bobonis explains that rainfall a¤ects total
household income through e¤ects on farm prots and on labor earnings. How-
ever, it is not clear that many households in the survey have farm prots since
most dont own farms and as we have mentioned above, agricultural prots are
missing for 96% of households in the sample. The discussion does not address
the point of how rainfall would a¤ect men and womens labour incomes di¤er-
ently. Yet,di¤erential e¤ect of rainfall on di¤erent sources of income is essential
for rainfall to be a valid distribution factor.
The use of rainfall as a distribution factor has appeared in the literature
following Duo and Udry (2004) (see also Goldstein and Udry, 2008). Duo
and Udry, however, study a specic context in the Ivory Coast, where men and
women control di¤erent plots and engage in the production of di¤erent goods
that require di¤erent amounts of rainfall. Therefore, in that context, a rainfall
shock that is good for the husband, can be bad (or less good) for the wife as
it a¤ects di¤erently the production of the gender specic commodities. It will
therefore change the relative bargaining power within a couple. This is not
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the case in Mexico, where the majority of our households are wage labourers.
We are not aware of any evidence that, for rural Mexico, points to situations
similar to that studied by Duo and Udry (2004) where women and men control
the production of di¤erent agricultural products. Paradoxically, in the paper,
Bobonis provides some evidence that demonstrates that in the Mexican context
the use of rainfall as a distribution factor is not warranted. On page 459, he
discusses the ejido system in Mexico where most women control no land and
stresses how the Mexican context is very di¤erent from what is prevalent in the
West African economies studied by Goldstein and Udry (2008) where women,
instead, control and put to productive use several plots of land by engaging in
the cultivation of produce which is di¤erent from that typically raised by men.
2. The use of PROGRESA to invert one of the z-demands. As we have
discussed in the text, the BBC09 approach requires at least two distribution
factors and the existence of a monotonic relationship between one of the distri-
bution factors used in the analysis and at least one of the commodities in the
demand system. If such a relationship exists, one can invert it and use that
commodity to summarize the e¤ects of all distribution factors in the rest of the
demand system. Monotonicity is required to guarantee the invertibility of the
function, that is to be able to express the distribution factor as a function of
the commodity. The variable used by Bobonis to invert a commodity demand
is the indicator variable for the assignement to PROGRESA. There is no sense
in which a monotonic relationship can be dened on a binary variable and,
therefore, the relationship between any of the commodities considered and the
distribution factor used by Bobonis is not invertible.
Even if one were able to avoid the technical issue (for instance by using
the potential Progresa grant as the distribution factor), there is an important
argument why one would want to use Progresa as the distribution factor to be
explained away rather than as the distribution factor used to construct the
z-demand functions. Indeed, it has been widely documented (in our papers
and in others we cite) that PROGRESA and similar conditional cash transfers
induce a shift in the demand system that is inconsistent with the unitary model.
This is powerful evidence because it uses variation in the allocation of resources
that is exogenous by construction. Then the interesting question is: can one
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use a completely unrelated distribution factor together with the structure of the
collective model to explain such a shift? This is what we do in our paper and
in doing so we set a fairly high hurdle for the collective model.
3 The demand system estimation. The demand system Bobonis esti-
mates is specied in terms of log shares, as linear functions of distribution fac-
tors and log total expenditure. In the estimation results, all commodities have
the same number of observations, 11,733 (contradicting section IV-B, where it
is stated that the sample used for the analysis is 3,900 households). In the
data, however, expenditures on commodities are zero for many household and
it would be impossible to take logs of shares in such instances. In the sample
used by Bobonis, and for the goods he analyses, the proportions of zeros are as
follows: female clothing, 54%; male clothing, 62%; childrens clothing, 30%; ed-
ucation, 56%; transport, 67%; alcohol and tobacco, 95%; medicine, 85%; other
household goods, 21%. It appears, from the programs Bobonis posted on line,
that he adds a small number to the zeros to be able to take logs. Such a practice
is completely arbitrary and should not be used.
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